Webworm spies rebuilt SoftEther VPN to dodge detection

Published

The China-aligned espionage group Webworm has found a way to keep long-term access inside government networks without writing any malware. According to a new analysis by Rapid7's Milan Spinka, the group rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge from source code and removed, one by one, the tells that security teams use to spot it.

The result is a tool that does nothing a legitimate VPN would not do. That is the point. At the time of Rapid7's analysis, only one antivirus engine on VirusTotal flagged the sample, even though it had been public since January.

Same VPN, different fingerprints

Webworm was already known for dropping stock SoftEther VPN into compromised government networks to bridge them to attacker infrastructure. Once that habit was documented, defenders could hunt for it. Rapid7 says the group's answer was a custom build, version 4.44 build 9807, that it attributes to Webworm with moderate confidence.

The changes are methodical. The file calls itself netcapa.exe, "Network Monitor Software" from a made-up company, and internal strings swap "SoftEther VPN" for "NtMonitor VPN", though the renaming is inconsistent and the service name SEVPNBRIDGE survives. The protocol's well-known web paths were changed to innocent-looking ones, /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi, and the handshake "watermark" that stock SoftEther uses was replaced with a truncated PNG of the Windows logo, so neither ordinary SoftEther clients nor fingerprinting tools recognise it.

Two more giveaways went too. The hamcore.se2 resource archive that normally sits beside the executable is shrunk and embedded inside the binary, adding about 1.5 MB. The configuration file, normally readable plain text, is renamed setting.conf and encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher, marked by the magic bytes RCEN.

Why Rapid7 points at Webworm

Rapid7 found no backdoor or extra command execution in the build, concluding that the actor prioritises stealth over raw capability. The attribution rests on overlap with Webworm tradecraft previously reported by ESET and on decrypted configurations: in every case the VPN cascades a remote network into the local one, and in real deployments the remote address sat in AS 20473, The Constant Company (including its subsidiary Vultr), which has repeatedly been linked to the group.

Rapid7 describes it as a hybrid between the custom malware Webworm used to write and the dual-use tools ESET saw it shift to earlier this year: legitimate software, not trojanised, but rebuilt so its detection footprint is gone. The group's focus is government organisations, especially in Europe.

Hunt for POSTs to /update/picture.cgi

Rapid7 has published IoCs, a YARA ruleset and a configuration decryption script on its GitHub repository, linked from the report. If you can inspect TLS traffic, its most reliable current detection is a POST request to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type: image/jpeg whose body starts with the bytes 89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52.

Rapid7 warns that the branding, endpoints and watermark are all trivial for the actor to change next time, and urges government defenders to learn how SoftEther behaves at a deeper level rather than chasing strings. That is the real lesson here: when the attacker's tool is legitimate software, the only durable signal is behaviour that has no business on your network, such as a bridge quietly joining your LAN to a rented cloud server.

This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.

Read the full analysis on IntelFusions