India and China traded a record $155.6 billion in 2025 and share a disputed 3,488 km border, and neither wants a repeat of the 1962 war. So, according to a new analysis from Sekoia's threat intelligence team, both sides have spent the past decade fighting quietly in each other's networks instead.
The report pulls together Sekoia's own monitoring and open-source reporting to map which intrusion sets work for each side, what they go after, and why. Sekoia is clear about the limits: espionage is stealthier and less documented than ransomware, so the campaigns it lists do not represent the full number of operations.
Galwan turned a rivalry into a target list
The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which killed soldiers on both sides, is the inflection point in Sekoia's timeline. In its aftermath, China-nexus actors ran an intelligence-gathering campaign against 10 Indian power sector organizations and two government-owned seaports. RedEcho, which Sekoia describes as linked to the People's Liberation Army, targeted at least four of India's five Regional Load Despatch Centres, the facilities that monitor and control electricity across the grid. RedFoxtrot hit Indian aerospace and defence contractors, telecoms and government bodies in 2020 and 2021.
The traffic ran both ways. Antiy reported a suspected India-origin group, Young Elephant, stealing intelligence from Chinese institutions in mid-2021, and Sekoia assesses that the campaign likely supported India's strategic objectives at the time.
Dams, Tibet and vaccines are all fair game
Sekoia argues the targeting follows geopolitics closely. India's hosting of the Tibetan government-in-exile has drawn China-nexus watering hole attacks on India-based Tibetan sites, and Sekoia expects that targeting to continue, with medium confidence, as the Dalai Lama's succession becomes a live issue. In mid-2026 Mustang Panda used hydropower-themed lures against the Indian government, which Sekoia ties to the fight over the Brahmaputra river and China's Medog dam upstream of disputed Arunachal Pradesh.
Research is a shared obsession. Sekoia cites APT10 targeting the Serum Institute of India and Bharat Biotech in 2021, and on the Indian side, Patchwork campaigns against Chinese universities and research bodies. In February 2025 Sekoia itself found Patchwork's BADNEWS remote access trojan used against China and Pakistan with lures such as lists of graduating military-medicine students.
The newest front is India's banks
The most recent shift is financial. In April 2026, Sekoia reports, Mustang Panda deployed an updated LOTUSLITE backdoor against India's banking sector using lures themed on HDFC Bank. Sekoia links the timing to India's March 2026 easing of Press Note 3 restrictions on Chinese investment, and says the activity may indicate a growing interest in capital flows and compliance data.
On attribution, Sekoia notes that India-nexus labels such as Patchwork and BitterAPT are vendor assessments, with no government attribution found in the reporting it reviewed. It also describes a tool-sharing ecosystem among India-nexus clusters, with Proofpoint and Threatray linking BitterAPT, Mysterious Elephant and Confucius through a shared backdoor.
Expect pharma, energy and finance to stay in scope
For defenders in either country, the practical takeaway is the sector list. Sekoia assesses that China-nexus actors will likely keep targeting Indian hydropower and energy infrastructure, and, with moderate confidence, that India-nexus groups may continue going after Chinese energy and research institutions. Organizations in power, water, pharmaceuticals, academia and banking should read the full report's intrusion set profiles against their own threat models. Our India country profile tracks related activity.
The picture Sekoia paints is of two governments that have decided open conflict is too expensive and espionage is not, which is exactly why this contest is unlikely to cool down.
This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.