ScreenConnect worm turns customer PCs against MSP techs

Published

Attackers who got into managed service providers' cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances have been turning the remote-support tool against the customers it is meant to look after, installing their own remote-access clients and a worm Microsoft calls SCKit that is built to jump back to the technicians who connect for support.

ConnectWise began reporting the campaign on November 11. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has confirmed it and published an analysis of the toolkit, warning that simply removing a rogue ScreenConnect client neither removes SCKit's persistence nor invalidates sessions the attackers may already hold.

A second ScreenConnect client, quietly installed

The attack starts on a customer endpoint. Using the MSP's own ScreenConnect management instance, the attackers send commands that launch cmd.exe, download an MSI with curl.exe from an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect server, and install it silently. The result is a second ScreenConnect client that connects to the attackers rather than to the MSP. Locking down the legitimate console does not remove it.

A batch launcher then pulls a PowerShell decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev. The decoder fetches an encrypted bundle keyed to the machine's own MachineGuid, decrypts it with AES-256, and unpacks the toolkit. Persistence comes from a scheduled task and a machine-wide Run key value named RelayTrapLiteAlert, with scripts under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. The kit also writes Microsoft Defender exclusions for its installers.

Waiting for the technician to connect

The most unusual part is RelayTrap. A watcher on the infected endpoint polls every 10 seconds, finds the installed ScreenConnect clients, and compiles a malicious replacement client from their own libraries. When a technician later connects with a vulnerable host client, RelayTrap tries to push the batch launcher onto the technician's workstation, moving the infection upstream to the MSP.

Once on a technician's machine, SCKit hunts for ScreenConnect console login cookies (.ASPXAUTH) in Chrome, Edge, Opera and Opera GX, both in the cookie databases and in browser memory. With a stolen session, its distribution component can upload a payload through ScreenConnect's Shared Toolbox, queue it on every device that account can reach, and then delete the toolbox item. Microsoft stresses that its propagation diagram describes the toolkit's design, not a confirmed chain of infections.

How the attackers first got in is still under investigation. ConnectWise is examining extension abuse, including a reported flaw in RMM+ extension versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 that accepted an empty access key when none was configured, letting a caller submit commands to managed endpoints without a normal sign-in.

Update technician clients to 26.6.5 and disable the extensions

Infrastructure listed by Microsoft includes ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 and 155[.]94[.]150[.]39. The full hash list and Defender XDR hunting queries are in Microsoft's report.

The uncomfortable lesson for MSPs is that a support session is a trust relationship running in both directions, and SCKit is designed to abuse it from the customer's end.

This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.

Read the full analysis on IntelFusions