ONLYOFFICE bugs let view-only users take root in container

Published

A user who has only been allowed to view a document in ONLYOFFICE Docs could chain flaws in the product to run operating system commands as root inside its official DocumentServer container, according to research published by Rapid7. The same bugs also let a viewer pull files off the server and recover document data the viewer never displays, even when downloading has been switched off.

ONLYOFFICE Docs provides the online editors that integrating applications embed to open documents, spreadsheets, presentations, forms and PDFs. Rapid7 senior security researcher Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat) found the issues as part of the company's research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite, one such integrating application. ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five findings are fixed in Document Server 10.0, and Rapid7 has published its full technical write-up along with proof-of-concept code on GitHub.

Five bugs, ranked by severity

One shared key opened the builder

The chain starts with a token problem. When an application such as Zimbra opens a document, it supplies a signed credential (a JSON Web Token, or JWT) describing the user's permissions. Rapid7 found that, in the tested build, the same signing key validated both those editor tokens and requests to DocBuilder, a scripting endpoint that generates documents on the server. A view-only token therefore passed the DocBuilder check without any edit, download or print permission.

From there, a DocBuilder script could read any file readable by the service account. On the test system that included the configuration file holding the session signing key, which let the researcher forge credentials carrying document permissions the original viewer was never granted. Rapid7 notes that the underlying file-read behavior was reported to ONLYOFFICE by a researcher using the handle Ssani4 in November 2025 and closed as fixed in DocumentBuilder 9.2.0; Rapid7 reproduced it in 9.4.0 through the view-only token route.

From a file write to code execution

The code-execution step abuses DocBuilder's save function. A script could append its own conversion parameters, overriding the source and destination paths the server had chosen, and extract an attacker-supplied archive into any directory the service account could write to. Dropping a logging configuration into the watched data directory made the DocService process load attacker JavaScript without a restart. Rapid7 reports that this access then leads to root inside the container, and lists the root-helper command injection among the five findings.

Rapid7 adds that with the WOPI integration protocol enabled and an attacker-controlled source reachable and permitted by its IP filter, the same DocBuilder authorization failure provides an unauthenticated entry point. Rapid7's write-up does not report exploitation in the wild.

Upgrade to Document Server 10.0

The fix is Document Server 10.0. Rapid7's review of 10.0.0-169 found that DocBuilder now rejects tokens carrying document-opening fields, native file reads are checked against the font map, and the save function strips the path parameters the attack relied on. Exploitation was demonstrated only on 9.4.0-129, and Rapid7 says the broader affected-version range is unknown, so self-hosted deployments older than 10.0 should be upgraded. That includes ONLYOFFICE instances sitting behind Zimbra, a platform attackers have leaned on heavily this year, most recently through a flaw used to raid mail servers.

The research is a reminder that "view only" is a promise the interface makes, and it holds only if the server enforces it on every endpoint the token can reach.

This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.

Read the full analysis on IntelFusions