Suspected North Korean crew hides RAT servers on Solana

Published

Cisco Talos has uncovered a financially motivated group that hides the address of its control servers inside Solana blockchain transactions, so that taking down a domain or a server does not cut off its malware. One of its implants also plants itself in the Windows recovery environment, letting it run again even after a victim uses "Reset this PC".

Talos tracks the group as UAT-12643 and, in research by Chetan Raghuprasad, assesses with low confidence that it is aligned with North Korea, based on overlaps in tactics with known North Korean actors. The targets appear to be cryptocurrency holders, gamers, Viber users and VoIP softphone operators, with file-harvesting keywords in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese pointing to victims in Europe.

A sloppy server gave the game away

Talos found the group's staging server at 41[.]216[.]188[.]11, running a Flask file-delivery service on port 8000 with its root folder exposed to the internet. That operational security slip handed researchers the toolkit, the C2 port map and even the script the actor uses to build its booby-trapped Windows shortcuts. Stolen data does not go to the C2 at all: the actor gets a Discord webhook alert with a victim fingerprint and a download link, while the archive itself sits on gofile[.]io.

Initial access comes three ways: shortcut files dressed up as PDFs that abuse Microsoft Defender's MpCmdRun.exe or certutil to download the payload, HTA files run through mshta.exe, and MSBuild project files that compile and run C# in memory using a spoofed BITS user agent. Talos did not observe how those files reach victims.

A RAT that crashes Windows if you kill it

The main implant is a Go build of the Overlord RAT with 35 commands covering keylogging, webcam and microphone capture, file theft, script execution, a reverse SOCKS proxy for reaching internal hosts, and in-memory plugin loading. With admin rights it marks itself as a critical system process, so forcibly ending it triggers a blue screen with the stop code CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED.

For persistence it uses a registry Run key and, more unusually, writes itself into the Windows Recovery Environment's OEM folder and patches ResetConfig.xml. Whenever the victim resets the PC, WinRE runs the RAT before restoring the system.

To find its C2, the RAT queries an actor-controlled Solana wallet's transaction history and looks for Memo Program instructions exactly 43 characters long, which hold the AES-encrypted WebSocket URL. Updating the C2 costs the actor one transaction, and every infected machine picks it up on its next check. In a companion piece, Raghuprasad argues defenders need to watch for unusual outbound JSON-RPC traffic rather than rely on domain blocklists. The approach is familiar from EtherRAT's use of Ethereum.

Why the North Korea link is only "low confidence"

Talos notes that a cluster tracked as UNK_DeadDrop, likely North Korean, used Overlord RAT in campaigns reported in June 2026, and that the Solana memo technique was first reported in March 2026 in connection with Lazarus Group. But Talos also says both the RAT and the Solana technique have been used by other actors, which is why it keeps its attribution at low confidence. That fits a broader pattern of North Korean tooling spreading beyond its original crews.

The second payload, the "Good Game" stealer, is a public Python tool by a developer Talos names as CirqueiraDev, not the actor. It checks for sandboxes, disables Task Manager while it runs, and harvests 23 browser families, Discord and Roblox sessions, 21 crypto wallets and Steam, Riot, Epic and Rockstar launchers. A third payload swaps cryptocurrency addresses on the clipboard.

Block the LOLBins and watch Solana RPC traffic

The blockchain trick makes the C2 hard to kill, but this actor still left its own front door open. The tradecraft is resilient; the operator is not.

This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.

Read the full analysis on IntelFusions