A Russian espionage group stole an entire US organization's cloud drive and staff directory in late 2025, then used what it took to pose as that organization's employees and break into a second US organization in 2026. That is the chain Mandiant and the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) lay out in a new case study by Josh Murchie, John Wolfram, Joseph Spero, Peter Ukhanov, Fernando Tomlinson, Jr. and Wesley Shields.
The group is COLD RELIC, the name Google now uses for the actor it previously tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057, also known as Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear. The US Department of Justice has assessed that it operates within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). GTIG says it has tracked and disrupted the group's phishing since 2015 and saw new phishing operations as recently as November 2026.
Each victim becomes the next lure
COLD RELIC's habit is to turn one compromise into credibility for the next. Once inside, it uses stolen email and documents to build authentic pretexts and impersonate real contacts. Its targets, according to GTIG, include government officials, defense contractors and non-governmental organizations across Europe and North America.
The phishing links themselves carry a tell. The group typically sends a link to a compromised legitimate website that redirects to the real phishing domain, which lets it fingerprint visitors and hide its own infrastructure. The link often ends in an attacker-set parameter naming a previous victim or the lure topic, such as ?file= or ?ref=. GTIG matched one redirector URL submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026 whose parameter referenced the first victim organization.
A Super Admin account and a tenant-wide export
In the late-2025 intrusion, COLD RELIC logged in with stolen credentials for a Google Workspace Super Admin account, routed through a US residential proxy near the victim, and wore the user down with repeated MFA push requests until one was accepted. It then registered a new device and leaned on passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices to keep access.
With those privileges it downloaded the organization's entire cloud drive, mass-shared files to an attacker-run email account, exported the full employee list and launched a domain-wide Customer Takeout export. It also queried audit logs and deleted Alert Center notifications to cover its tracks. Access lasted several months, including OAuth mail sync to external clients and logins with attacker-enrolled passkeys that survived password and session resets.
After being removed, the group used accounts impersonating that organization's staff to go after its employees and their professional contacts.
The second break-in started on a messaging app
In 2026, COLD RELIC contacted an employee of a second US organization over an encrypted messaging app while posing as someone from the first victim. During the conversation it shared links that stole credentials and tokens for Microsoft Entra ID, which that organization used as single sign-on for Google Workspace, and redirected to document lures matching the chat. It then enrolled its own MFA device and bulk-downloaded files from the user's cloud drive. Afterwards, the messaging account's profile was changed to a new persona, which GTIG believes was likely used to keep targeting the same professional circle.
In one case, a victim that reset passwords but did not revoke existing sessions left COLD RELIC inside. The group also runs broad phishing waves, but this report details its cloud tradecraft in unusual depth.
Revoke sessions, not just passwords
- Move privileged users to phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 hardware keys, and require out-of-band approval for new MFA devices and passkeys.
- When remediating, revoke all browser sessions, refresh tokens and third-party OAuth grants in both Google Workspace and Entra ID, and remove unknown passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices.
- Alert on Customer Takeout creation, user-list downloads, Alert Center deletions, audit-log queries by unexpected users, and bulk downloads or external sharing from residential ASNs.
- Enrich sign-in logs with residential proxy and VPN reputation data; GTIG names AS5650 and AS20115 as examples of ranges to restrict for admin access.
- Use DLP rules to flag files containing passwords, rosters or .pst archives, since stored secrets widened the damage here.
The lesson is that a message from a familiar colleague at a partner organization is exactly the cover this group is built to exploit.
This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.