A home automation controller that switches relays, gates and blinds shipped with its management interface wide open. CERT Polska has coordinated the disclosure of 11 vulnerabilities in boneIO Black, tracked as CVE-2026-77052 through CVE-2026-77062, and the most basic of them is simple: authentication was disabled by default, and the web API listened on every network interface.
The flaws were reported by researcher Mateusz Włodarczak (s3ga), according to CERT Polska's advisory. All of them are fixed in boneIO 1.6.0. CERT Polska's advisory lists a weakness class (CWE) for each issue but publishes no CVSS scores, so the ordering below follows the impact the advisory itself describes.
Anyone on the network could run commands
The two worst issues need no credentials at all. CVE-2026-77052 is a Node-RED instance exposed without authentication at the /nodered/ path through a Caddy reverse proxy. Node-RED's Admin API lets a user deploy flows that run system commands, so an unauthenticated attacker on the local network could deploy a malicious flow, execute code and, in CERT Polska's words, gain full control over the home automation system.
CVE-2026-77053 is the default-off authentication itself. Every endpoint of the management API answered without credentials, letting a remote attacker change configuration, cause a denial of service and operate the connected physical circuits. That one bug amplifies several others: CVE-2026-77054 returns the MQTT broker and web panel passwords in cleartext from GET /api/config, CVE-2026-77061 leaves several endpoints (logs, firmware version, serial number, MQTT username) outside authentication entirely, and the CSRF and clickjacking flaws (CVE-2026-77058 and CVE-2026-77062) mean a user on the internal network who simply visits a malicious web page can trigger relay, gate and blind actions on the attacker's behalf.
Shared passwords and an easy path to root
The device image adds its own problems. CVE-2026-77056 is a Mosquitto MQTT broker shipped with the same default credentials on every unit, credentials that are publicly documented on GitHub. CERT Polska says they give full read and write access to the broker, enough to control connected relays, blinds and gates and to inject fake entities into a linked Home Assistant installation. The broker's password file was also world-readable (CVE-2026-77060).
Locally, the boneio service account had passwordless sudo and docker group membership (CVE-2026-77055), and a race condition in the timezone sudoers helper (CVE-2026-77059) allowed sudoers rule injection. Either path leads to root. The web login and SSH also allowed unlimited guessing with no password complexity rules (CVE-2026-77057).
Upgrade to 1.6.0, then change the MQTT password yourself
Version 1.6.0 forces the owner to create an administrator account in a first-run wizard before the API accepts requests, puts every API route behind an authenticated role, hashes panel passwords with salted scrypt, rate-limits logins and removes the sudo and docker privileges through signed migrations. Two details matter for anyone patching:
- Older units cannot be upgraded in place. Versions before 1.2.0 run on Debian 10, are no longer supported and must be re-flashed with the 1.6.0 system image.
- Upgrading does not rotate the MQTT credentials. New images generate a per-device broker password at first boot, but upgraded devices keep their existing ones. From 1.6.0 the web panel warns when the published defaults are still in use, and the owner has to change them by hand.
CERT Polska has run a steady stream of coordinated disclosures this year, including its MikroTik patch-diffing analysis. This one is a reminder that "local network only" is a weak comfort for a device that opens gates: a single compromised laptop, or one click on the wrong web page, puts every boneIO-controlled circuit in reach. See our Poland country profile for more of CERT Polska's work.
This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.