The South Asian espionage group known as Bitter is using a previously undocumented remote access trojan called PapRAT against organizations in the region, delivering it through three separate infection chains built on shortcut files, disk images and Windows installers. The research behind the finding comes from Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs, and the details below are drawn from a Rewterz advisory summarising that research, which also lists the indicators.
Bitter, which IntelFusions profiles as BITTER, is also tracked as APT-C-08, APT-Q-37, Hazy Tiger, Orange Yali, T-APT-17 and TA397. What stands out this time is that PapRAT exists in two implementations, one in C++ and one in Rust, and the Rust build does more.
One spy tool, written twice
Both versions let the operator run commands, upload, download and delete files, list folders and drives, and take screenshots. PapRAT supports eight primary commands, and the Rust variant adds three more covering PowerShell execution, sleep and polling control, and process termination. In the third infection chain the attackers also deployed WmRAT, a separate remote access tool previously associated with Bitter, so a victim of that chain ends up with two backdoors.
Shortcuts, disk images and an old FTP tool
None of the three chains described relies on a software flaw; each depends on a victim opening a file.
- Chain one uses a malicious Windows shortcut (LNK) file that abuses the legitimate ftp.exe utility to run scripts and create scheduled tasks that keep the machine in touch with the command server.
- Chain two ships a virtual hard disk (VHDX) image containing an LNK file that opens a decoy Excel spreadsheet while quietly running an MSI installer that deploys PapRAT.
- Chain three uses an internet shortcut (URL file) to fetch an LNK file over WebDAV, which then launches an MSI installer.
Once inside, the operators lean on built-in Windows tools to survey the machine, collecting directory listings, user folders, installed antivirus products, scheduled tasks and mounted drives. That output is saved as abc.pdf, sent to attacker infrastructure with curl and then deleted. Another script retrieves a file named talk.log holding Base64-encoded PowerShell instructions for further commands.
Block shortcut files and watch ftp.exe
The advisory recommends restricting LNK and URL shortcut files that arrive by email or from outside sources, inspecting VHDX images and MSI packages before they run, and limiting or disabling WebDAV where it is not needed. Defenders should alert on unusual use of ftp.exe, curl and PowerShell, on new or modified scheduled tasks, and on unexpected outbound transfers. Application allowlisting stops unauthorised MSI installers from running at all.
Indicators of compromise
- Domains: netmansrvdns[.]com, rappellingaart[.]com
- URLs: hxxps://techtalkhelp[.]com/talk[.]log, hxxps://goodnfortunes[.]com/ucl[.]php, hxxps://felixfuturenext[.]com/Epistemological/, hxxp://gomescareerplans[.]com/docs, hxxp://www[.]rivingtonclarks[.]com/beautiQuewonders/banaNa[.]php
- SHA-256: a3081df333ca7f18bd90d10a45125ab5011dcf9d2806feae2935f09cab07da4c, e3992f8c945b0761242377cba32d91b0a390c7cecd79478439843d93e6d2b76b, ccefbdec2718d864d9d33c743aabfcef88a8d7904d1c598bfcf15cf5f3591c88, 569a21b519aaac8c92f653d708ab6ef34e3f38ea967f47e041d1e2425f6a4b33
Rewriting a working tool in a second language is not cheap, and a group that does it while still layering in an older backdoor is investing in access it expects to keep.
This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.