Attackers are exploiting a critical flaw in Apache Axis, an old Java library for building SOAP web services, to hit Atlassian Confluence Data Center servers. Rapid7's managed detection team detected exploitation against Confluence in a customer environment on November 13, and N-able separately reported in-the-wild attacks on its N-central remote management platform the same day, for a vulnerability Rapid7 says strongly correlates with the same bug.
The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-90436, was disclosed by the Apache Software Foundation on November 6, 2026. It is an unsafe reflection weakness (CWE-470, a bug class in which outside input can influence which code a program loads) in Axis 1.x that allows unauthenticated remote code execution. CISA has assigned it a CVSS score of 9.8. In its emergent threat analysis, Rapid7 recommends remediating exposed systems on an emergency basis, outside normal patching cycles.
A dead library hiding inside two products
Axis itself is end of life. Versions 1.x through 1.4 are affected, and Apache does not plan to publish a fixed 1.x release. It recommends moving to another SOAP engine, such as Axis 2, or using an Axis 1.x build with its patch applied.
The real exposure since the disclosure has come from products that quietly bundle the library. Rapid7 notes that some versions of Confluence Data Center and N-central turned out to use the affected Axis code. In both cases a non-default configuration is required for the product to be vulnerable, which limits the pool of targets but does not remove it.
For N-central, the timing is bad. A proof-of-concept exploit that uses CVE-2026-90436 against the platform was published on November 12 as part of a series of public zero-day disclosures, days after the Able2Shell exploit release pushed N-able to take servers offline. An RMM server can administer every endpoint it manages, so one compromised instance can reach a managed service provider's downstream customers.
Confluence: upgrade to 9.2.28 or switch off the Remote API
Atlassian lists Confluence Data Center versions 1.x through 9.x as affected when the "Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)" setting is enabled. That setting has been off by default for new installations since version 3.0. Version 9.2.28 is the fixed release. Confluence 10.x and later removed the feature, so they are not vulnerable, and Atlassian Cloud is unaffected. It is the second serious Data Center issue in a little over a month, after an unauthenticated file-read bug in October.
If patching has to wait, administrators can open General Configuration, then Further Configuration, clear the Remote API option and save. The change takes effect without a restart, though integrations that rely on the API may stop working.
N-central: confirm Legacy API is off, then take HF3
On-premises N-central administrators should confirm that "Legacy API" is disabled, even on 2026.4 HF2. N-able says the setting is off by default. Its November 13 guidance says hosted environments received temporary protections directly, but customers in both hosting models must still follow the vendor's Agent and Probe upgrade guidance. N-able has also temporarily disabled its Intune integration as a precaution.
N-able says 2026.4 HF3 will permanently remove Legacy API access. Its November 16 rollout notice states that hosted upgrades are complete and that on-premises general availability is being finalized.
Indicators to hunt for
Rapid7 tied these IP addresses to the Confluence exploitation it observed:
- 192[.]238[.]253[.]176
- 5[.]133[.]47[.]243
- 163[.]182[.]68[.]109
- 104[.]13[.]106[.]166
N-able's November 13 incident update lists these for N-central customers who had not disabled Legacy API:
- 157[.]20[.]241[.]16
- 139[.]99[.]69[.]109
- 79[.]76[.]51[.]56
Rapid7 cautions that finding these addresses in logs should prompt an investigation, but their absence does not confirm an environment was unaffected. Any instance that was internet-facing with the relevant API enabled should be investigated for compromise, not just patched.
The wider lesson is about inventory. Few Confluence or N-central owners would have listed Apache Axis among their dependencies, and an end-of-life library with no upstream fix can stay exploitable inside commercial products long after its own project has moved on.
This briefing is provided by IntelFusions for informational and defensive purposes only. It is based on sources assessed to be reliable at the time of writing, and analytic judgments carry the confidence levels indicated. Indicators of compromise are defanged; re-arm them only in controlled environments. IntelFusions is not affiliated with the organizations named and makes no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.